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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2-2(3) (j) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL AS AGAINST THE STATE DEFENDANTS 
IS TIME BARRED. 
II. WHETHER THE RECORD DEVELOPED BY WRITTEN DISCOVERY WAS 
ADEQUATE TO DETERMINE WHICH ACTIVITIES AND DECISIONS WERE 
"POLICY" AND WHICH WERE "OPERATIONAL." 
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ACTIVITIES 
OF THE STATE DEFENDANTS ARE PROTECTED BY THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The above issues are questions of law, upon which the trial 
court's decisions are reviewed for correctness, without deferring 
to the trial court's legal determinations. Allen v. Prudential 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 800 (Utah 1992) (reviewing 
summary judgment). The trial court's decisions are presumed to 
be correct, and grounds are sought upon which they may be upheld. 
Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State Defendants generally adopt Plaintiffs' Statement 
of the Case with the exception of plaintiffs' representation that 
the case was remanded by this Court to the district court "for a 
full and adequate evidentiary hearing." This Court's decision 
did not require an evidentiary hearing, but simply remanded the 
case to the district court to develop an adequate record to 
enable them to separate decisions qualifying as "operational" 
from those qualifying as "policy." That record was adequately 
developed by written discovery. 
The State defendants also object to plaintiffs' reference to 
all defendants as "the government." The actions of all defen-
dants cannot be lumped together because the issues involved 
require a determination as to which entities made decisions or 
participated in activities qualifying as "operational" and which 
entities made decisions or participated in activities qualifying 
as "policy." The activities must be considered individually and 
in connection with the particular entity that performed the 
activity or made the decision in order to determine the immunity 
status of each governmental entity named as a defendant. 
Upon remand, the State defendants served written discovery 
on plaintiffs, seeking to identify the specific claims of the 
plaintiffs as to the State defendants. While the plaintiffs 
itemized a number of claimed acts of negligence, only two of the 
claims were for activities or decisions undertaken by the State 
defendants. All other claims were directed toward Salt Lake City 
or Salt Lake County. The discretionary functions and "policy" 
decisions of the State defendants during the 1983 flooding are 
protected by sovereign immunity. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The winter of 1982-83 was a record water year where 
almost twice the normal precipitation accumulated in the moun-
tains surrounding Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 6, Complaint H 18). 
2. City Creek Canyon drains into a series of conduits 
which eventually pass under North Temple street. (R. 6, 
Complaint K 19). 
3. North Temple Street between 200 West and 1-80 is a 
State Highway, designated SR 186 (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 27-12-49.1, 
copy attached as Exhibit "A"). 
4. on June 1, 19 83, the North Temple conduits clogged and 
water was diverted above ground along North Temple, restricting 
access to properties along North Temple street. (R. 7, Complaint 
1 21). 
5. The channel was eventually narrowed to a 7-foot ditch 
in the middle of North Temple and excavation was begun to 
alleviate the clogging in the underground conduits, requiring 
incoming eastbound tourist traffic to detour along streets behind 
plaintiffs' properties to obtain access to their businesses. (R. 
7-8, Complaint H 23; R. 584, Deposition of Albert E. Haines, III, 
p. 33; R. 582, Deposition of Max Peterson, p. 63). 
6. Flood control in the area in question is under the 
jurisdiction of Salt Lake County, and Salt Lake City and Salt 
Lake County, through their flood control departments undertook to 
maintain the conduits in question. (R. 581, Deposition of 
-3-
Richard Holzworth, Director, Flood Control Division, Salt Lake 
County Public Works Dept., p. 35; R. 582, Deposition of Max 
Peterson, Salt Lake City Engineer, p. 36). 
7. All of the storm drain repair work and flood control 
was supervised and managed by Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County 
officials, with no State participation. (R. 581, Deposition of 
Richard Holzworth, Salt Lake County, p. 35; R. 582, Deposition of 
Max Peterson, Salt Lake City, p. 36; R. 585, Deposition of Blaine 
Kay, UDOT, pp. 12, 14, 15). 
Note: The depositions have not been paginated, but each 
deposition assigned one page number in the record below. 
Consequently the pages referred to are attached as part of the 
Addendum, to assist this Court in its review of the record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case was remanded so that an adequate record could be 
developed to separate the decisions that qualify as "policy" from 
those that are "operational." 
An adequate record can be established through depositions, 
affidavits, written discovery, and other evidence. While an 
evidentiary hearing can be relied upon, it is not necessary to 
the development of an adequate record in every case. 
Plaintiffs' Answers to Interrogatories provided enough of a 
record, when considered with the existing record, to determine 
which activities were attributable to the State defendants, and 
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whether those activities were protected by sovereign immunity. 
The trial court appropriately granted Summary Judgment to the 
State defendants, and plaintiffs failed to timely file a Notice 
of Appeal, thus barring this appeal as to the State defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TO THE STATE OF 
UTAH ON FEBRUARY 26, 1991 WAS A FINAL ORDER 
AND THIS APPEAL IS TIME BARRED AS TO THE 
STATE DEFENDANTS 
Judge Murphy entered his Memorandum Decision and Order, 
granting the State of Utah's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
February 26, 1991. (R. 719-723). Summary Judgment was signed 
and entered on April 17, 1991, the last paragraph of which 
specifically states: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court has determined 
that there is no just reason for delay and directs 
entry of Judgment in accordance with Rule 54(b) 
U.R.C.P. 
(R. 748-750). 
Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. reads in pertinent part: 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action . . . and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as 
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court 
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added) 
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As Plaintiffs point out, the initial question of whether an 
order is eligible for certification under Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law. Kennecott Corp. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). This court has 
discussed three requirements for proper certification under Rule 
54(b) : 
First, there must be multiple claims for relief or 
multiple parties to the action. Second, the judgment 
appealed from must have been entered on an order that 
would be appealable but for the fact that other claims 
or parties remain in the action. Third, the trial 
court, in its discretion, must make a determination 
that "there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal. 
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, at 767 (Utah 1984) 
(quoting 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civ. 2d Sec. 2656, at 47-48 (1983)). 
The first criteria has been met; there are multiple claims 
and multiple parties. The third criteria was also met when the 
trial court found no just reason for delay. (R. 748-750). 
In this case the focus is on the second criteria; whether 
the order upon which the judgment and certification entered was 
one that would otherwise have been appealable absent the other 
claims. Plaintiffs argue that because the underlying facts 
giving rise to the lawsuit are the same, that the claim against 
the State of Utah is not "separate" from the claims against the 
other defendants. 
The State of Utah, however, was dismissed on immunity 
grounds, while the other defendants remained in the suit on duty, 
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negligence, and damages issues, as well as immunity grounds. In 
Bennion v. Pennzoil Company, 826 P.2d 137,138 (Utah 1992), this 
court concluded that: 
certification was generally precluded where there was 
significant 'factual overlap' between the operative 
facts of the certified and unlitigated claims and where 
the outcome of the appeal of the certified claims 
theoretically would have a res judicata effect on the 
unlitigated claims remaining before the trial court. . 
. . [A] claim is not separate if a decision on claims 
remaining below would moot the issues on appeal. 
While there were still issues pending against the remaining 
defendants, and those issues arose out of the same fact situa-
tion, a separate decision on those claims would not moot the 
issues as to the State's immunity. The record generated enabled 
the trial court to separate decisions of each of the named 
governmental entities as "policy" or "operational" decisions. A 
determination that the only decisions made by the State defen-
dants were "policy" has no res judicata effect on any subsequent 
determination as to the decisions made or activities undertaken 
by the City and County defendants. 
The Order as to the State of Utah was final on April 17, 
1991. Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal was not dated, but included a 
mailing certificate indicating that copies were mailed to defen-
dants on November 18, 1991. (R. 1542-1595). Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a Notice of Appeal 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
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Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal was not timely filed and their 
appeal is thus time barred as to the State defendants. 
POINT II. 
THE RECORD DEVELOPED BY WRITTEN DISCOVERY IS 
ADEQUATE TO DETERMINE WHICH ACTIVITIES AND 
DECISIONS ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE STATE 
DEFENDANTS, AND WHETHER THOSE ACTIVITIES AND 
DECISIONS ARE PROTECTED BY THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
All defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on 
governmental immunity and all motions were granted at the trial 
court level on November 27, 1984. Plaintiffs then appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court and the case was reversed and remanded on 
December 14, 1989. 
Following remand, the State defendants propounded written 
discovery requests and after receiving plaintiffs Answers to 
Interrogatories, again moved for summary judgment, which was 
granted on February 26, 1991 and entered on April 17, 1991. 
Plaintiffs contend that the summary judgment decided on 
February 26, 1991 by the district court was inconsistent with 
this Court's directive. Plaintiffs assert that separating 
"policy" decisions from "operational" decisions in this case can 
only be done by first having a full evidentiary hearing. This 
court remanded this case to the trial court for the sole purpose 
of developing an "adequate record" as to who made the decisions 
pertaining to operation and maintenance of which plaintiffs 
complain, when they were made and under what conditions. These 
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factual findings as to the State defendants are important in 
determining governmental immunity. 
Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, including depo-
sitions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits and admissions, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the losing party, show 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jensen 
v. Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co., 611 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980). 
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P., deals generally with the materials 
that may properly be considered on a motion for summary judgment, 
specifying pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
admissions, and affidavits. No one source or combination of 
materials is required to be used. 6 Moore's Federal Practice, 
1 56.11[1]. 
The Answers to Interrogatories submitted by plaintiffs 
following this court's remand are sufficient to establish an 
adequate record, when considered with the prior existing record, 
to enable the trial court and this Court to decide which deci-
sions were operational and which constituted policy. Rule 56(c) 
specifically includes "answers to interrogatories" among the 
materials which may be considered to decide a motion for summary 
judgment. .Id. at 56.11[1]. 
An adequate record has been established to address the 
questions of which State decisions and activities were policy and 
whether any State decisions or activities were operational. The 
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trial court determined that all involvement of the State defen-
dants was protected by sovereign immunity and summary judgment 
was therefore proper under the circumstances. 
POINT III, 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
STATE OF UTAH IS IMMUNE BY VIRTUE OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Justice Howe, in writing the unanimous opinion of this 
court, when the matter was originally appealed, held that the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of storm systems was and 
is a governmental function and that all of the defendants' 
activities in the instant case are covered by the Governmental 
Immunity Act. The Court pointed out that because the matter was 
decided by summary judgment at the trial court level, it did not 
have before it a record from which it could be determined who 
made the decisions pertaining to operation and maintenance of 
which plaintiffs complain, when they were made, and under what 
conditions. 
These decisions may not have been made on the policy 
level on which decisions were made before the flood as 
to the design, capacity, and construction of the City 
Creek drainage system. When the flood waters came, 
many decisions were doubtlessly made in a short time as 
to what course of action should be taken. An adequate 
record needs to be developed to separate what decisions 
qualify as 'policy' from those that may have been only 
'operational.' We remand the case to the trial court 
for that purpose. 
Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc.. et al. v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, et al.. 784 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah 1989). 
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Following remand, the State defendants served Interroga-
tories on plaintiffs to determine the specific claims as to the 
State defendants. While plaintiffs specified a number of claimed 
acts of negligence, only two of plaintiffs' negligence claims are 
attributable to the State defendants: 
1. The State's allowance of the City in the early 
part of June [1983] to cut the top of the North Temple 
storm drain without a permit requiring the street 
surface to be replaced in a timely manner. 
2. The State's failure to timely restore the street 
surface along North Temple near plaintiff's property to 
restore ingress and egress. 
(See Answer #1 to Plaintiffs' Answers to State of Utah's First 
Set of Interrogatories, R. 636-642, and attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B"). All other claims are directed toward Salt Lake 
City or Salt Lake County. 
The State defendants are entitled to summary judgment based 
on sovereign immunity for discretionary functions and "policy" 
decisions made during the 1983 flooding. 
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Ann., 1953 (as amended) provides 
in part: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, 
all governmental entities are immune from suit for any 
injury that results from the exercise of a governmental 
function . . . . 
While there has been much discussion in recent case law 
regarding what is a governmental function, there can be no doubt 
that the alleged actions of the State defendants in this case are 
governmental functions for which immunity has not been waived. 
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With regard to the claim that the State failed to timely 
restore the street surface along North Temple near plaintiffs' 
property to restore ingress and egress, immunity clearly applies. 
First, the State did not perform any of the repair work or 
excavation. Those activities were performed by City and County 
officials and employees. The State is mandated under Section 27-
12-14, U.C.A., to cooperate with cities and counties in the 
maintenance and use of public roads. The evidence is undisputed 
by plaintiffs or by Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County that the 
State defendants did not engage in operational activities dealing 
with the flooding. All such operational activities were under-
taken by Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County. Operational 
decisions are those which concern routine, everyday matters, not 
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors. Frank v. State, 
613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980). The State's abdication of opera-
tional duties consistent with Section 27-12-14, U.C.A., was a 
policy decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court, considering the original appeal of 
this matter, reiterated the four-part test adopted in Little v. 
Utah State Div. of Family Servs.. 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983) to 
determine whether government acts and decisions are purely 
discretionary: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision 
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, 
program, or objective? 
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(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision 
essential to the realization or accomplishment of that 
policy, program or objective as opposed to one which 
would not change the course or direction of the policy, 
program, or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the 
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and 
expertise on the part of the governmental agency 
involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the 
requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful 
authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, 
omission, or decision? 
Rocky Mountain Thrift, supra, at 463, citing Little, supra. 
In making the initial decision whether to allow local 
entities to excavate along North Temple, the State defendants 
answer all four questions in the affirmative- First, it is a 
basic governmental objective to effectively and efficiently 
control and manage highways, waterways and other governmental 
facilities to protect life and property; and it has been a state 
policy to render jurisdiction for those activities to local 
entities. Second, deciding whether and when to excavate and what 
course must be followed to manage the flood waters is clearly 
essential to accomplishing the governmental objective of promot-
ing public safety. Third, the decision requires the exercise of 
basic policy judgment, such as how best to expend public funds to 
manage and control flood waters, and the setting of governmental 
priorities. Fourth, the Utah Legislature has empowered cities 
and counties with the option to provide flood control and other 
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disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-5a-l. 
The State defendants had nothing to do with the cleaning and 
maintenance of the culverts; nor did they remove grates covering 
the inlet openings; nor did they repair cuts in the street 
surface. All of these activities were undertaken and managed by 
local governmental entities as outlined in the depositions of 
Richard Holzworth, Max Peterson, Blaine Kay and Albert Haines, 
and referred to in the Statement of Facts. The decision to 
transfer such decision making powers to the local governments is 
a "policy" decision for which immunity is not waived and plain-
tiffs' claims in that regard are therefore barred. 
The only other claim directed toward the State defendants is 
the allegation that the State was negligent in allowing the City 
in the early part of June [1983] to cut the top of the North 
Temple storm drain without a permit requiring the street surface 
to be replaced in a timely manner. Under subsection 63-30-10(3), 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the state retains immunity 
for any alleged negligent act or omission that arises out of the 
issuance or failure to issue a permit, license, approval or 
similar authorization. 
The State defendants are immune from suit under this statu-
tory provision on two theories: (a) the alleged injury arose out 
of the issuance of the approval to use North Temple Street as a 
waterway and the approval of local government's control and 
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management of the situation; and (b) the alleged injury caused by 
the excavation of the street arose out of the issuance of, or the 
failure to issue, a permit. 
Issuing approval to use North Temple Street was a discre-
tionary function authorized by The Disaster Response and Recovery 
Act, Section 63-5a-l, Utah Code Ann., 1953. Section 63-5a-3(a) 
empowers the governor to utilize all available resources of state 
government as reasonably necessary to cope with a state of 
emergency. That the action was both reasonable and necessary is 
obvious from the fact that City and County engineers considered 
every possible alternative before determining that the action 
taken was the best way to control the flooding. (R. 584, 
Deposition of Albert E. Haines, p. 26; R. 582, Deposition of Max 
Peterson, pp. 36, 68, 73, 74). 
Plaintiffs' claim is also barred because the injury claimed 
as a result of the excavation of the street arose out of the 
issuance or failure to issue a permit. Whenever repairs of this 
type are contemplated, the local governmental entity must apply 
for a permit before excavation may begin. Section 27-12-133, 
U.C.A., (1953, as amended). Salt Lake County did not obtain the 
necessary permit until after the excavation had begun because of 
the immediacy of the situation. The County did ultimately apply 
for and receive a permit to excavate from the Utah Department of 
Transportation. Thus, any claim for damages based on negligence 
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arising out of the issuance of the permit is barred by Sec. 63-
30-10(3), Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's ruling, granting summary judgment to the State 
defendants. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Zl day of June, 1993. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By fov*<£ &W~C444€f^ 
Anne Swensen 
Attorneys for State Respondents 
10270.461 \Bricf 
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1 Street between Sixth and Ninth West? 
2 A Yes. We have a permit which was issued and authorized 
3 by Mr. Sapko by which the— 
4 MR. CUTLER: Excuse me. 
5 MR. WARNER: Yes. Let me clarify. Are you referring 
6 to the culvert design prior to the spring flooding? 
7 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry. 
8 MR. THEODORE: Yes, let's clarify that. This line 
9 of questioning is prior to the spring flooding. 
10 THE WITNESS: No. I have no knowledge that we have 
11 a record which we could find of any design approval of the 
12 original culvert. That's been in there a long time. 
13 Q (3y Mr. Theodore) With respect to the answers in 
14 your Interrogatories, you indicate that you've been using the 
15 culvert underlying North Temple for some road drainage into the 
16 system; is that correct? 
17 A The drainage that accumulates along the curb and 
1Q gutter, yes, is collected and deposited in the culvert. 
19 Q Do you recall when those drainage culverts were 
20 installed as part of this road system? 
21 A The present system was installed in '73 or f 74 when 
22 North Temple was widened. 
23 Q What type of maintenance does the State perform on 
24 the drainage culverts, if any? 
25
 A The drainage culvert and storm sewer is maintained 
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1 Q Were any kind of measures taken to change the pro-
2 cedures for handling anticipated runoff subsequent to December 
3 of '82? 
4 A As concerns UDOT, it wasn't different, but there was 
5 probably additional emphasis in cleaning out our drainage 
6 facilities and channels. 
7 Q Do you recall if the State did any kind of cleaning 
8 in the North Temple culvert? 
9 A I don't believe we did clean the storm sewers out. 
10 Q Who is in charge of the manhole covers in whether 
11 they were bolted down on North Temple? 
12 A If they were manholes for the storm sewer
 f it would 
13 be local entities responsibility. If we come on a situation 
14 where it is a hazard, we would make correction and notify City 
15 or County. 
16 Q Did the State require that the manhole covers be 
17 bolted down as part of this preparation for the runoff? 
18 A I don't know. Not that I'm aware. 
19 Q Do you recall if any other kinds of procedures were 
20 taken with respect to the water before it got into the City 
21 Creek culvert system above the Memory Grove area? 
22 A No, I had no great access or involvement to that. 
23 Q Do you have any State highways or any other kind of 
24 facilities in the Memory Grove area that you supervise as part 
25 of your operations? 
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1 A No, not down at the drainage level. We supervise 
2 the road that is approved for the route running around the 
£ Capitol. That's at a higher elevation. 
4 Q With respect to the culvert, when it ends up in the 
5 Jordan River, do you maintain any part of the culvert as it 
6 runs into the Jordan River? 
7 A No. 
8 Q Now, subsequent to the flood, with respect to the 
9 reconstruction and repairs, you indicated that you issued a 
10 permit for Four Way Construction. 
11 Do you recall whether there were any design changes 
12 in the size or capacity of the pipe as part of that permit? 
13 MR. SMITH: I object to the question as totally 
14 outside the scope of the lawsuit and irrelevant to the matter. 
15 MR. WARNER: Well, I would join in the objection so 
16 far as to relevance, but I will allow Mr. Kay to answer the 
17 question inasmuch as this is discovery, and you may feel like 
18 it will lead you to something else, I don't know, but I would 
19 register my objection as well but allow him to answer. 
20 Q (By Mr. Theodore) Do you recall of any design 
21 changes made in the system? 
22 A Would you please clarify? You mean from the existing 
23 J system or during the progress? 
Q From the existing system to the reconstruction phase 24 
25
 was there any change in design? 
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1 of the staff discussions that went on in the operating center, 
2 but I can't recall specifically when those were made. 
3 Q Did that decision have any relevance to the Countyfs 
4 overall flood program? I'm sure there was some kind of overall 
5 attempt to divert the water for at least the amount of damage. 
5 Was that decision to put it down North Temple consistent with 
7 the overall plan; do you recall? 
Q A I would say yes, it was. Our overall plan was to 
9 find the least disruptive way to carry that water on the surface 
10 and keep it off private property. 
11 Q Now, again, I understand these relationships are 
12 maybe a little hazy. Did the County assume some responsibility 
13 for repairing the storm drain under North Temple after the 
14 flooding had subsided? 
15 A I'd say yes, we have. We've assumed the responsi-
16 bility for managing the total repair program in Salt Lake County, 
17 and City Creek and the storm drain under North Temple as part 
18 of that activity are being repaired as a County facility. 
19 Q Let me ask you about the diversion of the water out 
20 of the stream bed at City Creek. Now, as I understood from 
2i your prior testimony, it initially occurred because there was 
22 just too much water for the intake valve to handle. It jumped 
23 for a short period of time. 
24 A That's correct. 
25 Q Then apparently there was a second point where it 
35 
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i MR. CUTLER: Well, I object to the compound nature of 
2 the question. 
3 MR. THEODORE: Let's take it one stop at a time, 
4 Q Did the engineers then start a design program to 
5 restore the road surface of North T e m p l e ? ^ . 
6 |T A The restoration work for the flood damage was the 
7 responsibility of the County, and they hired a project manager 
Q and started the efforts of restoring the damaged facilities. 
9 Q So the City did not participate in the restoration 
io work after you left on the 17th of June? 
11 MR. CUTLER: Excuse me. What do you mean by 
12 restoration? I think Mr. Peterson is talking repairing and 
13 replacing the conduit and not doing the mud cleanup. Is there 
14 a confusion in your Blind on that, Mr. Peterson? 
15 THE WITNESS: You1re talking about just restoring 
16 the conduit? 
17 Q (By Mr, Theodore) Restoring the conduit and the 
18 road surface is the thrust of my question. 
19 Q We would want to review anything the County had done 
20 that was within the City boundaries. 
21 Q Were you subsequently presented with a set of plans 
22 to complete the surfacing and restorating of the culvert? 
23 A Yes, The plans were prepared by the County, and we 
24 reviewed those plans* 
25 Q When were those plans submitted to you for review? 
36 
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1 Q I take it there were times that you went down and 
2 inspected the North Temple area? 
3 A Yes, every day. 
4 Q What areas were completely blocked, and by that I 
5 mean what areas of North Temple had surface water blocking the 
6 normal entryway to businesses? 
7 A The area basically from Sixth West on to the Jordan 
8 River at sometime. 
9 Q How long did that last? 
10 A I think it started somewhere around the 29th. First 
11 we started the sandbagging on the 28th, and then we had the 
12 29th, so it was from that time until it was cleaned up on the 
13 16th of June, but as they cleaned up, they cleaned up starting 
14 from Jordan River working back, so some of those businesses to 
15 the west had earlier access. 
16 Q Maybe you don't know this, but if you know, do you 
17 know if those businesses in the area that you've described had 
18 access to them through other areas, side, rear, alley? 
19 A Some of them did. 
20 Q Can you tell us which areas or which businesses? 
21 Is that something that you can recall or you know at this point? 
22 A Well, the bowling alley could have got access there 
23 from Sixth West from the south side of North Temple, and some 
24 of the other businesses right on the intersections could have 
25
 [got access from those side streets, but which individual 
HARMON. SHINDURLING, BROWN & THACKER 6 3 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
1 area of North Temple at the time the plug developed? 
2 A Yes. We would have had serious flooding out on Sixth 
3 West, Seventh West, all those residential areas and out toward 
4 the railroad tracks. 
5 Q So State Street, in effect, relieved the problems 
6 that existed—that would otherwise have existed on North Temple? 
7 A It saved that emergency. It saved that part of the 
8 City. 
9 Q Now, Mr. Theodore asked you some questions about the 
io possibilities of using other drainage systems to carry water 
11 rather than North Temple. 
12 To divert the water into these other systems, is it 
13 true that you would have had to utilize other City streets to 
14 carry that water to reach the inlets? 
15 A Yes, and we expressed other options before we took 
16 all the water down State because of the -trying fn tnkfl water— 
17 £ato Eighth and Ninth^ and there was no other way that we could 
18 have effectively handled that flow. 
19 Q As a matter of fact, it would just tie up other City 
20 streets than North Temple it would sound to me like, or is that 
21 correct? 
22 A Plus it would have impacted the railroad. 
23 Q I want to ask you a question or two about using steel 
24 plates. Is it safe to lay steel plates across an open trench 
25
 that carries traffic the extent of North Temple? 
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1 [ A There was some flooding when the conduit completely 
2 I plugged up going out toward the north. It was mainly in the 
3 street system, and the railroad was impacted till we could get 
4 the water fully diverted down State Street, but that was the 
5 only time I'm aware of they had any problems out there. 
6 Q Other than that the water was fully contained within 
7 I the road system? 
A Yes. 
9 I MR. CUTLER: That^s all I have. 
10 MR. THEODORE: Just briefly. 
11 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. THEODORE: 
13 Q You indicated in response to Mr. Smith's question 
14 that there was some possibility of diverting it to an area with 
15 railroad tracks other than the North Temple Street area. Can 
16 you delineate on the map which area you're referring to? 
17 A The water diverted onto—the railroad tracks were cnAiMfi 
18 plugged up, and it was flowing out north in this area (indi-
19 | eating). 
20 | Q Could this street right here have been used for the 
21 I drainage channel Cindicating)? 
22 MR. OLSEN: What street is that? 
23 MR. THEODORE: I'm trying to get it from the map 
24 letter. It looks like Second North Street. 
25 THE WITNESS: No, you cannot use that, because you 
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i have surface flow across the railroad tracks, and that would put 
2 the railroad out of commission. That would impact the railroad. 
3 Q (By Mr. Theodore) But other than that impacting the 
4 railroad, was that a possibility with respect to utilizing this 
5 street? 
6 1 A I think the grades on State Street where you've got 
7 «©therr slope up, I just don't think it would work in that area. 
8 Q What about the next street over? Could this street 
9 here below North Temple have been utilized? 
10 A South Temple, the downtown area. North Temple was 
n the logical place to carry it. 
12 Q I know it's logical, but we're dealing with an 
13 emergency situation. Which streets could you have used in 
14 this emergency situation? 
15 MR. CUTLER: If you analyzed that and are able to 
16 answer at this time, you may answer. If not, don't speculate. 
17 THE WITNESS: I can't say for sure, but we haven't 
18 analyzed it to that depth. 
19 Q (By Mr. Theodore) Well, you indicated that you were 
20 able to run along State Street, you went onto Fourth South. 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Then you went down to, what, Ninth South? 
23 A Eighth and Ninth South, yes. 
24 Q And there was a possibility of going all the way to 
25 approximately 13th? 
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1 could possibly do it to minimize that sort of loss. 
2 Q Could a residential street have been utilized to 
3 divert the water from the North Temple Street area? 
4 A In order to get the water to the Jordan River, the 
5 only street that we felt had a reasonable chance outside of 
6 North Temple was South Temple, but the engineering problems 
7 and the pumping requirements, the size of the diking to head 
8 it out from underneath the viaduct and west through the, I 
9 believe, Utah Power and Light facility would not only have 
io been prohibitive, but, more importantly, we could not have 
11 effected that kind of a project in time to offset the damage 
12 on North Temple, 
13 J Frankly, it's an option we're looking at now should 
14 | it occur again, and we think we can be prepared to do it, but 
15 I it could not have been done in the amount of time that we were 
16 looking at. 
17 J Q Can you briefly from the diagram here, here is the 
18 I South Temple area. Where would it be diverted from? This is 
19 North Temple right here (indicating). We're looking at the 
20 Capitol right here (indicating) . Approximately what west 
2i | did that diversion occur? 
22 | A Sixth West. It would have occurred right underneath 
23 I the viaduct. 
24 Q The viaduct is approximately here, these are the 
25 I tracks (indicating). 
— 
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underneath the Sixth West viaduct and open channelled water i 
along North Temple and then dropped it down about Eighth or 
Tenth West. 
During that time, we opened up part of the viaduct 
for business access on the south side of North. Temple, speci-
fically the bowling alley. I remember I had more than one 
discussion with the—I assume he's the owner of that operation. 
Q Who would that have been? 
A I think it was Wes Sine. 
Q Were there areas during that period of time that 
were completely blocked? I'm talking about that North Temple 
access. 
A Yes. 
Q Were there some that were totally blocked for a 
period of time? 
A On North Temple? Yes. 
Q What areas would that have been? 
A Well, I can recall, I think there's a Denny's or a 
Wendy's there. I don't know what intersection it's at. Eighth 
West maybe. I know that area for a time was completely blocked 
off from any access off of North Temple. 
Q How long would that have heen, again if you know? 
A I don't know. 
Q In response to a question by Mr. Theodore, you 
indicated that at a certain point the City was playing an 
33 
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27-12-49.1. State highways — SR-181, SR-184, SR-186, 
SR-189, SR-190. 
The following named roads are designated as state highways: 
(1) SR-181. From Route 152 north via Thirteenth East Street to Route 
186 in Salt Lake City. 
(2) SR-184. From Route 89 at North Temple and State Streets in Salt 
Lake City northerly via State Street to the State Capitol; thence westerly 
via Second North and northerly via Columbus Street and Victory Road to 
Route 89 at Beck Street. 
(3) SR-186. From Route 80 east via North Temple Street in Salt Lake 
City to Third West Street; thence south via Third West Street to Fourth 
South Street; thence easterly via Fourth South, Tenth East, Fifth South 
Streets, and Foothill Boulevard to Route 80 near the mouth of Parley's 
Canyon. 
(4) SR-189. From Route 15 south of Provo northerly via University 
Avenue and Provo Canyon to Route 40 south of Heber. 
(5) SR-190. From Route 215 at Knudsen's Corner southeasterly to 
Route 210 at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon; thence easterly via 
Big Cottonwood Canyon to Brighton, including Brighton Loop; thence 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, 
INC., et al. , 
VS. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
ANSWERS TO STATE OF UTAH'S FIRST 
SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO 
PLAINTIFFS 
Civil No. C83-6678 
Judge Michael Murphy 
Plaintiffs submit the following answers to defendants State of Utah, Scott Matheson, State 
Council of Defense and State Road Commission's interrogatories: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Set forth in detail the manner in which you claim defendant State 
of Utah was negligent as alleged in plaintiffs' Verified Complaint and set forth each fact known to 
you supporting each such claim. 
The State of Utahmarticipated in various State Council of Defense meetinas (planning 
resoonses to the flooding. To the extent that the State of Utah participated and authorized the 
following acts of omission or negligence, they are liable to plaintiffs for the damages so caused: 
Plaintiffs presently do not have the names and identities of all persons performing 
negligent acts or omissions in this complaint. This information should be contained in the brief 
1 
written historical summary of the Public Works Department's involvement with the Command 
Center meetings coordinating the county wide flood control efforts. To date, Salt Lake City 
Corporation has failed to produce this document pursuant to the Request for Production of 
Documents. However, it is expected that the following witnesses will be called to establish the 
acts of negligence outlined below on the part of the various defendants: 
Richard T. Holzworth, Director of County Flood Control. 
Charles Harvey Call, Jr., Drainage Design Engineer for Salt Lake City Corporation 
Frank M. Helm, Principal of Helm & Sons, Inc. responsible for augering the North Temple Storm 
Drain after the flood. 
Albert E. Haines, 111, Chief of Management Operations of the Command Center 
Blain Kay, District Director of District 2 of the Utah Department of Transportation 
Max Peterson, Deputy City Engineer 
Barry Sine, an officer in or employee of Sine Investment, Inc., Site, Inc., Rancho Lanes, Inc., 
Jerry Sine Investments, and Stockholm Restaurant, Inc. 
Joe Talebreza, former City Engineer 
Representatives from BECKO, Inc. concerning the blasting 
Joe Anderson, Division Leader for Salt Lake City Public Works Dept. 
Representatives from the Salt Lake City Streets and Sanitation Division. 
Representatives from Salt Lake County Flood Control 
Professor Clark A. Lin, independent expert on flood control management and systems operations. 
Marv Harris, CPA will be called to testify regarding the business records and accounts. 
2 
The dates and times of the alleged negligent acts or omissions occurred over a period of 
approximately a year. These dates are primarily in the following sequential order: 
1. The failure to prepare the storm drain along North Temple and clean the same for 
passing runoff from the record snow fall accumulating beginning February through the flood in 
June. 
2. The use of a drag line within the storm drain along North Temple the first of June, 
where the cable snapped, precluding the use of augering equipment, thereby necessitating the cut 
of the street surface in mid June; 
3) The use of a 12 inch auger the first part of June, rather than a 48 inch auger, 
delaying the cleaning of storm drain for over a week. 
4) The employment of blasting within the clogged enclosed pipe the first part of June, 
delaying the augering and cleaning of the North Temple storm drain; 
5) The use of fire hoses the first part of June to try and remove debris from the enclosed 
pipe, delaying the augering and cleaning of the North Temple storm drain; 
6) Knowing that debris collection basins were not installed at the mouth of City Creek 
Canyon, the City beginning the Memorial Day weekend failed to divert the debris flows above 
ground until these debris flows subsided to prevent the clogging of the North Temple storm 
drain. 
7)^The State's allowance of the City in the early part of June to cut the top of the North 
Temjws-etorm drain without a permit requiring the street surface to be replaced in a timely 
manner. 
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8) \Yo the extent that the State retains an interest in the North Temple aqueduct, and has 
responsibility for cleaning the same, it is liable for failure to maintain and clean out the same 
prior to the flooding. 
9) The City's failure to place plates over their cuts in the street surface along North 
Temple near plaintiffs property to restore ingress and egress in the same manner as with the 
Flying J. property. 
10) The County's failure all throughout 1983 to properly supervise and instruct City 
personnel in proper flood management procedures. 
11) The County's failure to employ proper flood management procedures from February 
through June on the City Creek storm drain system. 
12) The State's failure to timely restore the street surface along North Temple near/ 
plaintiffs property to restore ingress and egress in the same manner as with the Flying J. 
property. 
The above acts affected plaintiffs' real estate necessitating extensive clean up of debris 
deposited on plaintiffs' properties caused by the plugged North Temple storm drain system. This 
negligent operation and use of the storm drain system depositing debris on plaintiffs' properties, 
and particularly defendants' failure to promptly restore the road surface, caused extensive clean 
up damage and the obstruction of the properties1 ingress and egress. The encroachment onto 
Plaintiffs property with debris and the placement of sandbags thereon, the erection of traffic 
barriers, flashing barricades, and leaving an open trench in the middle of the road in front of 
plaintiffs' properties obstructed ingress and egress and the use of Plaintiffs' properties, 
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resulting in lost profits and damages. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Set forth in detail the manner in which you claim defendant Scott 
Matheson was negligent as alleged in plaintiffs' Verified Complaint and set forth each fact known 
to you supporting each such claim. 
Answer: To the extent that defendant Scott Matheson authorized and participated in the 
State Council of Defense's involvement with Salt Lake City Public Works Department's Command 
Center meetings, he is liable to plaintiffs for the damages so caused. This interrogatory will be 
supplemented upon receipt of the diary of the Command Center's operations from the City. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Set forth in detail the manner in which you claim 
defendant State CounciLof JQgfense was negligent as alleged in plaintiffs' Verified Complaint and 
set forth each fact known to you supporting each such claim. 
Answer: See Answers to Interrogatory No. 11 and the depositions of the State Employees 
substantiating the generally acts of negligence outlined above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Set forth in detail the manner in which you claim 
defendant State Road Commission was negligent as alleged in plaintiffs' Verified Complaint and set 
forth each fact known to you supporting each such claim. 
Answer: Answer: See Answers to Interrogatory No. 1, and the depositions of the State 
Employees substantiating the generally acts of negligence outlined above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: As to each person who you may call as a witness to testify 
regarding your answers to the above interrogatories, give the following: 
(a) The witness' name, address and telephone number; 
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(b) The subject matter of the witness1 testimony; 
(c) Whether the witness will testify as an expert witness. 
Answer: See answers to Interrogatory No. 2. Professor Un and Marv Harris will be 
testifying as expert witnesses. Professor Un will testify regarding the the duty of care and 
system operations requirements which were violated by defendants' conduct. Marv Harris will 
testify regarding lost business and damages. 
INTERROGATORIES NO, 6: As to each expert witness which you may call to testify 
regarding your answers to the above interrogatories, give the following: 
(a) The expert's name, address and telephone number; 
(b) His or her area of expertise; 
(c) A summary of his or her conclusions or opinions. 
Answer: 
a) Professor Clark A. Un, #305 Eagle Plaza, 4505 Wasatch Blvd., Salt Lake City, Utah 
84124, telephone #272-8075. 
b) Professor Un is an expert in flood control, drainage and systems management. 
c) Professor Un's final conclusions or opinions regarding defendants' negligence will not 
be completed for another two weeks. At that time these Answers will be supplemented where 
necessary. 
a) Marv J. Harris, 409 South Main, Bountiful, Utah 84010 
b) Accountant and CPA 
c) Mr. Harris' final conclusions or opinions regarding the damages caused by defendants' 
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negligence will also not be completed for another two weeks. 
Dated this 17th day of August, 1990. 
Barry W. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of Aug 
<CcS 
V p<%; 
n^iSSto* ^ Notary Public residing in Salt Lake County 
flSRW 
/ . » My 
' . " ^ t 10-92 
My commission exr 
^ ' JI *"\f$jp CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I cernfyata^tlnailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answers to the State of 
Utah's Interrogatories to the following, postage prepaid this 18th day of August, 1990: 
Anne Swensen 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Kevin F. Smith 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Paul M. Warner 
Ass't Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Roger F. Cutler 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
451 South State, Suite 505 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Addenda 
27-12-14. Cooperation with counties, cities, towns, the fed-
eral government, and all state departments. 
(1) The department shall cooperate with the counties, cities, and towns in 
the construction, maintenance, and use of the highways and in all related 
matters, and may provide services to the counties, cities, and towns on terms 
mutually agreed upon. 
(2) The department, with the approval of the governor, shall cooperate with 
the federal government in all federal-aid projects and with all state depart-
ments in all matters in connection with the use of the highways. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 14; 1991, ch. sion" and inserted "towns" before "in the con-
137, § 6. struction" in Subsection (1); subdivided the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- section; and made stylistic changes and 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the changes in phraseology, 
section; substituted "department" for "commis-
f U H > X J . V I AM j A.AU 
PROTECTION OF HIGHWAYS 
27-12-133. Excavations, structures or objects prohibited 
within right-of-way except in accordance with 
regulations — Penalty for violation. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 54-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, no right-of-way of any state highway, county road or city street shall be 
dug up or excavated and no approach road, driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, 
sewer, ditch, culvert, billboard, advertising sign, or any other structure or 
object of any kind or character shall be placed, constructed, or maintained 
within any such right-of-way except as permitted by, and in accordance with, 
the regulations of the highway authorities having jurisdiction over such right-
of-way. 
Any person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a misde-
meanor. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 133, Obstruction of highways as nuisance, 
Cross-References. — Criminal offense to § 76-10-803. 
injure highways or bridges, § 76-8-419. Penalties for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 
76-3-201. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, Highway construction contractor's liability 
Streets, and Bridges §§ 258-265, 281 et seq. for injuries to third persons by materials or 
C.J.S. — 40 C.J.S. Highways § 217 et seq. debris on highway during course of construc-
AJLR. — Estoppel of municipality as to en- tion or repair, 3 A.L.R.4th 770. 
croachments upon public streets, 44 A.L.R3d Key Numbers. — Highways «=» 153 et seq. 
27-12-134. Authorities may regulate, require permit and 
security for excavation or construction — Limita-
tion on authority. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 54-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, the highway authorities of the state, counties, cities, and towns are 
authorized to adopt regulations, and may require a permit containing reason-
able terms and conditions, for the crossing, digging-up, or the placement, 
construction, and maintenance of approach roads, driveways, structures, 
poles, pipelines, conduits, sewers, ditches, culverts, facilities, or any other 
structures or objects of any kind or character on the public highway rights-of-
way under their respective jurisdiction. Said highway authorities may require 
a surety bond or other reasonable security which may be forfeited in the event 
the regulations or the conditions of a permit are breached. 
The authority granted by this section shall not be exercised so as to deny 
reasonable ingress and egress to property adjoining a public highway except 
where said highway authorities have acquired such right of ingress and 
egress by gift, agreement, purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise or where 
no right of ingress or egress exists between the right-of-way and the adjoining 
property. 
DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 63-5a-2 
Section 
63-5a-9. overstate agreements authorized 
Termination 
compacts between SUDOIVISIOI 
63-5a-L Legislative findings — Purpose Short title. 
(1) ' I "he Legislature finds that existing and increasing threats of the occur-
rence of destructive disasters resulting from attack, internal disturbance, nat-
ural phenomena or technological hazard could greatly affect the health, safety 
and welfare of the people of this state, and it is therefore necessary to grant to 
the governor of this state and its political subdivisions special emergency 
disaster authority. 
(2) It is the purpose of this act to assist the governor of this state and its 
political subdivisions to effectively provide emergency disaster response and 
recovery assistance in order to protect the lives and property of the people. 
This act shall be known and cited as the "Disaster Response and Recovery 
Act." 
History: L. 1981, ch. - , 1, ~JZ .. ^ - .*. ^ * ^ « 
Meaning of "this act". - The term "this §§ 63-5a-l lo 63-5a-iI.. 
act" referred to in. this section means Laws 
63-5a-2. uemutions. 
(1) "Disaster" means a situation causing, or threatening to cause, 'wide-
spread damage, social disruption, or injury or loss of life or property resulting 
from attack, interna 1 disturbance, natural phenomena or technological haz-
ard, 
(2) "Attack" means a nuclear, conventional, biological, or cliein ica 1 w a i^^ ^^^  i e 
action against the United States of America or this state. 
(3) "Internal disturbance" means a riot, prison break, disruptive terrorism 
or strike 
(4) ''Natural phenomena" means any earthquake, tornado, storm, flood, 
landslide, avalanche, forest or range fire, drought, or epidemic. 
(5) 'Technological hazard" means any hazardous materials accident, mine 
accident, train derailment, truck wreck, air crash, radiation incident, pollu-
tion, structural fire or explosion. 
(6) "State of emergency" means a condition in any part of this state which 
requires state government emergency assistance to supplement the local 
efforts of the affected political subdivision to save lives and to protect prop-
erty, public health, welfare, and safety in the event of a disaster or to avoid or 
reduce the threat of a disaster. 
(7) "Local emergency" means a condition in any political subdivision of the 
state which requires that emergency assistance be provided by the affected 
political subdivision to save lives and protect property within its jurisdiction 
in response to a disaster, or to avoid or reduce the threat of a disaster. 
(8) "Political subdivision" means municipality or county 
Section 
63-5a-10. Expenditures authorized by "'state of 
emergency" declaration. 
w
* ' thority additional to other emer-
gency authority. 
63-5a-3 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
History: L. 1981, ch. 253, § 2. 
63-5a-3. Authority of governor — Federal assistance — 
Fraud in application for financial assistance — 
Penalty. 
(1) In addition to any other authorities conferred upon the governor, the 
governor during the declared state of emergency is authorized and empowered 
to: 
(a) utilize all available resources of state government as reasonably 
necessary to cope with a "state of emergency"; 
(b) employ measures and give direction to state and local officers and 
agencies which are reasonable and necessary for the purpose of securing 
compliance with the provisions of this act and with orders, rules and 
regulations made pursuant to this act; 
(c) recommend and advise the evacuation of all or part of the popula-
tion from any stricken or threatened area within the state if necessary for 
the preservation of life; 
(d) recommend routes, modes of transportation, and destination in con-
nection with evacuation; 
(e) in connection with evacuation suspend or limit the sale, dispensing, 
or transportation of alcoholic beverages, explosives, and combustibles, not 
to include the lawful bearing of arms. 
(f) control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the move-
ment of persons within the area, and recommend the occupancy or evacu-
ation of premises in a disaster area. 
(g) clear or remove from publicly or privately owned land or water 
through the use of state departments or agencies, debris or wreckage 
which may threaten public health, public safety, or private property as 
hereinafter provided: 
(i) Whenever the governor provides for clearance of debris or 
wreckage pursuant to this subsection, employees of the designated 
state agencies are authorized to enter upon private land or waters 
and perform any tasks necessary for the removal or clearance opera-
tion. 
(ii) Authority under this subsection shall not be exercised unless 
the affected political subdivision, corporation, organization or indi-
vidual shall first present an unconditional authorization for removal 
of such debris or wreckage from private property and agree to indem-
nify the state government against any claim arising from such re-
moval, 
(h) recommend to the Legislature additional action he deems necessary 
to carry out the provisions of this act. 
(2) When the governor has proclaimed a "state of emergency" under this act 
and when the President of the United States, at the request of the governor, 
has declared an "emergency" or a "major disaster" to exist in this state, the 
governor is authorized: 
(a) To enter into agreement with any agency of the United States for 
+A**«i«tsv».o*~fr i»/vi<ic!;«nrr nnifc fn ha firrnrnpfl hv disaster victims and to make 
63-30-3 Immunity of governments itities from suit. 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only , the following state medical 
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are 
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and 
are considered to be governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician be-
cause of the high risk nature of the patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-
owned university hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians 
employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their 
employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate m^ 1 .are 
or treatment at another medical facility in Utah. 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a si i € d i i Di-
versity hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned univer-
sity acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is 
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state, 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the limits established in 
Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board 
of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmen-
tal entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental 
entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions 
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4. 
History: L. 1965, eh. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, 
§ 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, 
ch. 93, § 1; 1991f ch. 15, § 1; 1991, ch. 248 
§ 7. 
Amendment Notes, Hit"1 1991 ameru 
ment by ch. 15, effective April 29, 1991, added 
Subsection (2) and added Subsection designa 
tions (1) and (3). 
s ana ^esent ^ 
seciiun A£> set out as reconciled by i— 
>f Legislative Research and General 
Co. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application. 




Scho* - <i » ru'K)i districts. 
Subtii v i a u ill plan approval. 
Takings clause claim. 
Water storage tank. 
Construction and application. 
The 1984 amendment to this section could 
£J UL Ulit; U l l £ / j . vr • V A I X V M ~ 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any 
public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 9; 1991, ch. 76, ceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
§ 3. 63-30-10," and made a minor punctuation 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- change and deleted the former second sen-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added "Unless tence, which read: 'Immunity is not waived for 
the iryury arises out of one or more of the ex- latent defective conditions." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, inter-
ference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of 
civil rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
- (6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional; 
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
343 
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, ch. 
47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
(2), rewrote the second sentence which read 
"Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the 
Supreme Court is ten years and until his suc-
cessor is appointed and approved in accordance 
with Section 20-1-7.1" and, in Subsection (6), 
substituted "determines" for "decides" at the 
end of the fourth sentence. 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, deleted "next" after "January" and made 
punctuation changes in Subsection (2); deleted 
"not" following "chief justice may" in the third 
sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "additional" 
before "duties" in Subsection (5); deleted 
ing "chiet justice" and added as consistent 
with the law" at the end of Subsection (6). 
Cross-References. — Chief justice, Utah 
Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 2. 
Disqualification in particular <-as* | ;*ah 
Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 2. 
Judicial nomination and n. 
§ 20-1-7.1 et seq. 




Qualifications of j us; * c t., • 
Vm, Sec. 7. 
Retirement, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec 
§ 49-6-101 et seq., §§ 78-7-29, 78-7-30. 
Salary, Utah Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 14. 
LULLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J"u 
§§ 67, 68. 
C.J.S. — 21 C J 
C.J.S. Judge? ^ 
in I i in in ill1 
* l l l e t s e q . ; 4 8 A 
to 25, 85. 
ambers, — Courts ^ io i , 248; 
7 to 12. 
fs- 1 7ft-2-l.fi. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch, 
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court 
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, 
§ 4. 
Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981, 
ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices, 
was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effec-
tive July 1 , 1982 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, to a nswer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction, 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jun,-u* 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
• ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
ft 
(g) a final judgment or decree 01 any uuux t 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. victions"; substituted "(f)" for "(i)" at the end of 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, 
ch. 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted 
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to original 
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and 
enacts the above section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "for-
mal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in 
Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); re-
designated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) ac-
cordingly; substituted "(i)" for "(h)" at the end 
of Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
1989, added "and Forestry" at the end of Sub-
section (3)(e)(iii); rewrote Subsection (4)(a) 
which read "first degree and capital felony con-
Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Appeals from juve-
nile courts, § 78-3a-51. 
Appeals in criminal cases, U.R.Cr.P. 26. 
Chief justice to preside over impeachment of 
governor, § 77-5-2. 
Election contest appeals, §§ 20-3-35, 
20-15-14. 
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const. Art. VIII, 
Sec. 3; U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Industrial commission orders, review of, 
§ 35-1-36. 
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 3. 
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of 
disciplinary orders, §§ 78-51-14, 78-51-19. 
Unemployment compensation decisions, re-
view of, § 35-4-10. 
rleading «=> 001; rrocess ®» ^ to o. 
— What constitutes doing business 
Ruli 1 Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney, Separate summonses may be signed and 
served. 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced urui^i h. > ^ - :! ,r-
mons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than . J 
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of 
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely 
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or 
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within 
the 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or 
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain t±u 
court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the a, 
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state th<-
name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and 
otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time 
within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, 
and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by 
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the 
complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed with the 
court within ten days of service. If service is made by publication, the sum-
mons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or other 
relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file. 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served in this 
state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or 
constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the 
marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of 
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(] ) I Jpon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2), 
(3) or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint 
to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons 
and/or the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process; 
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy 
to the infant and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none 
can be found within the state, then to any person having the care and 
control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service 
the infant is employed; 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or 
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the person 
and to the person's legal representative if one has been appointed and in 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated 
by the state or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the 
person who has the care, custody, or control of the individual to be served, 
or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the indi-
vidual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, 
promptly deliver the process to the individual served; 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a 
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit 
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a man-
aging or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by 
law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by 
statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a 
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found within the 
state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, 
an office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does busi-
ness within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of 
such office or place of business; 
(6) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy thereof to 
the recorder; 
(7) Upon a county, by delivering a copy to the county clerk of such 
county; 
(8) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy to 
the superintendent or business administrator of the board; 
(9) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the 
president or secretary of its board; 
(10) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to 
be brought against the state, by delivering a copy to the attorney general 
and any other person or agency required by statute to be served; and 
(11) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any 
public board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy to 
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secre-
tary. 
(f) Service and proof of service in a foreign country. Service in a for-
eign country shall be made as follows: 
(1) In the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for 
service in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or 
(2) Upon an individual, by personal delivery; and upon a corporation, 
partnership or association, by delivering a copy to an officer or a manag-
ing general agent; provided that such service be made by a person who is 
not a party to the action, not a party's attorney, and is not less than 18 
years of age, or who is designated by order of the court or by the foreign 
court; or 
(3) By any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and 
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served as ordered by 
the court. Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed 
in these rules for service within this state, or by the law of the foreign 
country, or by order of the court. When service is made pursuant to sub-
part (3) of this subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed 
by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfac-
tory to the court. 
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be 
served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence, 
where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the 
circumstances, or where there exists good cause to believe that the person to 
be served is avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of nrnrpQQ 
by publication, by mail, or by some otner means, ine supporting amaavii 
shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be 
served, or the circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the 
individual parties. If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of 
process by publication, by mail from the clerk of the court, by other means, or 
by some combination of the above, provided that the means of notice employed 
shall be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the 
interested parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possi-
ble or practicable. The court's order shall also specify the content of the pro-
cess to be served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed 
complete. A copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with 
the process specified by the court. 
(h) Manner of proof. In a case commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the party 
serving the process shall file proof of service with the court promptly, and in 
any event within the time during which the person served must respond to the 
process, and proof of service must be made within ten days after such service. 
Failure to file proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. In all 
cases commenced under Rule 3(a)(1) or Rule Z(n)(9.) the proof of service shall 
be made as follows: 
(1) If served by a sheriff, constable, i n.i< iep-
uty of any of them, by certificate with a statement a. , ace, 
and manner of service; 
(2) If served by any other person, b\ : with a statement as to 
the date, place, and manner of service. : with the affiant's a^e at 
the time of service; 
(3) If served by publication, by a^ ailui^ . ..L ^ U L ^ I L ^ nur 
or that person's designated agent, showing p.. : ion. and sp ::^ the 
date of the first and last publications; and an alt:davit by the clerk of the 
court of a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the United 
States mail, if such mailing shall be required under this rule or by court 
order; 
(4) If" served by United States mail, by the affidavit of the clerk of the 
court showing a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the 
United States mail, as may be ordered by the court, together with any 
proof of receipt; 
(5) By the 'written admission or waiver of service oy i •»< >n to be 
served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved. 
(i) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and u r * ich terms as it 
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be 
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the 
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued. 
(j) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of 
the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall 
state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof. 
(k) Date of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the 
person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left 
for the person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and 
shall sign, his or her name thereto, and, If an officer, add his or her official 
title. 
(1) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any proceed-
ing where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court 
shall, upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate 
the newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall be made 
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and 
^ 1 1 "I 1 <" 1 •"• i 1 i I "i" 4 1 i, W "i-i II'TI "i c in 1 Q in m i o irf'jcn, 
w*« o uiuci tu participate m appeal secured by specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914. as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889. 
Power of s u c c e s s substituted master or ^ ^ ^ i T f ' c w f p T e u i " ^ 
referee to render decision or enter judgment on I A L R Fed 922 
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
 K e y ^ b e r g . _ E q u i t y ^ 393 to 395, 401, 
1 0 7 9
- 404 to 406; Reference «=» 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99 
Referee's failure to file report within time et seq. 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
